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The Importance of Reallocation for Productivity Growth:
Evidence from European and US Banking
By JAAP W.B. BOS, PETER C. VAN SANTEN, PAUL SCHILP *
This paper quantifies the effect of reallocation dynamics on aggregate
productivity developments in the banking sectors of Europe and the
United States. We document an increase in productivity over the period
1995-2009, on the order of 11% in the US and 19% in Europe. At
an annual frequency, under-performing banks capture market share,
while more productive banks lose market share, in particular in the
US. The pattern of reallocation is markedly different between the
geographical regions: European productivity has grown by reallocating
inputs through the first half of the sample, at the same time when
reallocation diminished growth in the US. Within-firm growth has been
rising steadily in both areas, largely due to technical change. The long-
run positive effects of creative destruction are especially apparent in the
US, where reallocation is an important driver of increases in aggregate
productivity.
JEL: O47; O30; D24; C24
Keywords: market structure, efficiency, restructuring, stochastic
frontier, banking.
I. Introduction
What drives industry growth in a consolidating market? Are all firms
becoming more productive? Or do the most productive firms survive? After
all, in a consolidating market, no firm’s market share is guaranteed. As market
concentration rises, the market restructures and scarce assets are reallocated
between survivors. This implies that some firms may come out on top, and
- through mergers or organic growth - capture more market share. Other
firms lose market share and may eventually leave the market altogether. Yet
others may see an opportunity to enter the consolidating markets. Since the
seminal work by Schumpeter (1942), these effects have been well-documented
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Netherlands, j.bos@maastrichtuniversity.nl. van Santen: Sveriges Riksbank, Monetary Policy Department,
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empirically.1 Among the key lessons taught to us by this literature, is the
notion that we need to investigate firm-level dynamics, in order to understand
aggregate outcomes (Caballero et al., 1997). Theoretical models of industry
dynamics emphasize selection effects at the firm level as well in shaping industry
outcomes.2
A change in market structure, in particular a rapid consolidation, is often the
result of a shock, such as (de)regulation, technological changes, or opening up to
trade (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Melitz, 2003; Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). The timing
and depth of the restructuring process depends on the timing and amplitude of
the shock, and on the stage of the economic cycle (Caballero and Engel, 1993).3
The reallocation itself may be smooth and rather instantaneous, but more likely
it is costly and less abrupt. Exactly how costly reallocation is depends on the
specificity of the industry’s resources. As a result, a growing literature has
studied possible reasons why resources may be more specific in some industries
than in other industries (Bertola and Caballero, 1994; Mitchell and Mulherin,
1996; Caballero and Hammour, 1998). In addition, institutional, legal and other
differences between countries may affect the specificity of resources, and thereby
may alter reallocation dynamics (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Bartelsman et al.,
2013). Thus, the degree of specificity may change the reallocation dynamics
(Caballero and Hammour, 1996).
Reallocation dynamics, however, are not just the result of specificity, but can
also be affected by regulation and other outside forces. The banking sector is
amongst the most regulated and supervised industries due to its importance
for economic growth and financial stability. In the US, banks have been subject
to branching restrictions and interstate banking prohibitions. Similarly, banks
in Europe have long been nationally oriented due to legal and institutional
differences between countries. Supported by research indicating significant
inefficiencies and the existence of economies of scale (Berger et al., 1995), size
regulations have been relaxed and institutional barriers lowered. Both banking
markets have faced significant regulatory changes, which have preceded the
restructuring of these markets. As a result, the banking landscape looks rather
different now compared to three decades ago: global banks supply their services
around the world, while universal banks have extended the range of financial
services. Naturally, expansions allow banks to exploit economies of scale and
scope, which should improve welfare. At the same time, the large flows of
taxpayers’ money to bail out large, systemic banks during the recent financial
crises has called for a re-evaluation of size restrictions. As a result, the banking
sectors are expected to continue restructuring.
The literature has evaluated the consequences of banking consolidation, and
1See, amongst others, Baily et al. (1992), King and Levine (1993), Klepper (1996), Olley and Pakes (1996)
and Collard-Wexler and de Loecker (2013).
2See, amongst others, Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995), Luttmer (2007) and
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
3Of course, the cycle itself may change because of the shock and the resulting structural changes.
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in particular mergers and acquisitions, on different measures of performance,
such as cost and profit efficiency (Stiroh and Strahan, 2003), the efficient scale of
production (Berger et al., 1999; Wheelock and Wilson, 1999, 2012) and productiv-
ity (Tirtirogˇlu et al., 2005; Delis et al., 2011). A common theme in these papers is
the study of bank-level performance measures. While useful for many purposes,
in this paper, we argue that a complete evaluation should also aim to quantify
the aggregate effects of restructuring. In particular, the aggregate outcomes
of consolidation are different if bad-performing banks expand compared to
when top-performing banks acquire more market share. To achieve this, we
quantify the productivity effects of both within-firm and between-firm changes
on productivity and market shares.
This approach is common in studies of the manufacturing industries where
reallocation of market shares, and the entry and exit of plants, is typically found
to improve aggregate outcomes in the long run (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000).
Of course, the role of reallocation in driving industry productivity is not limited
to manufacturing, but easily extends to banking.4 We study productivity of the
banking sector as it is important for the efficiency of bank lending (Wheelock
and Wilson, 1999), and therefore indirectly for the financial soundness of the
industry (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 2009), economic growth (Jayaratne and
Strahan, 1996) and the effectiveness of monetary policy (Kashyap and Stein,
2000). We quantify the effect of reallocation dynamics on aggregate productivity
developments in the banking sectors of Europe and the United States (US).5
We contribute to our understanding of aggregate productivity growth by
disentangling firm-specific productivity developments from reallocation effects.
We do so following three key steps. First, we model the production process
of bank outputs relying on a stochastic output distance frontier model. The
advantages of this approach are threefold: multiple inputs and outputs are
easily handled,6 output and input prices are not necessary to estimate the
production function parameters, and we do not need to make assumptions about
banks’ objective function (Coelli and Perelman, 2000). The distance function is
estimated using Call Report data for independent US banks, and BankScope data
for independent European banks, covering the period 1995-2009.
Second, we compute a Malmquist productivity (TFP) index (Caves et al., 1982)
for each bank-year observation. The Malmquist index is embedded in index
number theory, and allows for a decomposition of productivity growth into
changes in technical efficiency, returns to scale and technical progress. We use
a parametric version proposed by Orea (2002), which does not require input
4See recent work by Craig and Haubrich (2013) for an example of applying labor productivity concepts to
the banking sector, by studying gross loan flows.
5Throughout this paper, we use 'Europe' or 'EU' to refer to the EU-15, which includes Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
6This follows from the equivalence between output distance functions and the production function in the
single-input case, or the transformation function in the multiple-outputs case.
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and output prices, but instead computes the index as the ratio of two estimated
distance functions (Shephard, 1970).
Third, using the bank-level Malmquist indices, we construct an aggregate
measure of productivity in the banking sector. TFP growth is subsequently de-
composed into a component measuring bank-level productivity growth, as well
as a between-plant reallocation component. The latter is essentially a weighted
average of bank-level changes in market shares, and therefore quantifies the
effect of reallocation dynamics on aggregate productivity.
We document an increase in productivity for both European and US banking
sectors over the period 1995-2009, on the order of 11% in the US and 19%
in Europe. At an annual frequency, under-performing banks capture market
share, while more productive banks lose market share, in particular in the
US. The pattern of reallocation is markedly different between the geographical
regions: European productivity has grown by reallocating inputs through the
first half of the sample, at the same time when reallocation diminished growth
in the US. Within-firm growth has been rising steadily in both areas, largely
due to technical change. The long-run positive effects of creative destruction
are especially apparent in the US, where reallocation is an important driver of
increases in aggregate productivity.
We subsequently decompose within-firm growth in three components: im-
provements in technical efficiency, technical progress and returns to scale, all
of which are identified by decomposing the Malmquist TFP index. Of these
components, technical progress has been the driving force behind within-firm
growth. The US banking sector is characterized by decreasing returns to scale,
which restrains within-firm growth. In Europe, constant returns to scale do not
have an effect on productivity.7
Finally, in an attempt to better understand reallocation dynamics and its effect
on aggregate productivity, we relate reallocation to the bank size distribution
and market power. In the US, large banks have, on average, lost market share to
competitors, while being more productive, hence depressing aggregate growth;
the reverse is true in Europe where larger, more productive banks have grown
in size.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the banking sectors in
Europe and the United States, with particular focus on the consolidation process.
Section III presents the methodology and the data used in this paper. Section IV
reports the empirical results. Section V summarizes the findings and concludes.
7Recent work by Wheelock and Wilson (2012) shows that US banks are characterized by economies of
scale. Note that this is not incompatible with our result: only under price-taking in input and output markets
do economies of scale imply increasing returns to scale. We, nor Wheelock and Wilson (2012) make this
assumption.
4
II. Consolidation in banking
The restructuring process of an industry is linked closely to what Schumpeter
(1942) referred to as creative destruction. If the 'invisible hand' works properly,
the firms with the lowest average costs survive, while the bad performers
will ultimately cease to exist. On the industry level, this evolution should
foster economic growth, and in the presence of scale economies will result in a
more consolidated industry. Although in practice we do observe consolidation,
within-sector differences can be quite large and persistent over time (Baily
et al., 1992). We can distinguish between two elements that drive consolidation:
market-level developments and firm-level dynamics, the latter being the subject
of research in this paper.
For the former, we can point out four causes of consolidation (Berger et al.,
1999). First, technological progress, e.g. internet banking, has increased the
optimal scale of a bank (DeYoung et al., 2007). Second, improvements in financial
conditions yielded higher profits, which freed resources available for takeovers.
Third, excess capacity can be put into use for scale enlargement, reducing
existing inefficiencies. Finally, to facilitate positive returns to scale, countries
deregulate and loosen geographical and/or product restrictions.
Figure 1. : Consolidation in banking
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Note: HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, defined as the sum of the squared market shares. Market shares
are calculated based on total inputs, and 0 < HHI ≤ 10000. Plotted are fractional polynomial fits based on
calculated HHI values.
Both in Europe and in the US, banking markets have faced significant regula-
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tory changes which were expected to lead to a restructuring of these markets.8
For US banks, geographical restrictions have been lifted in two steps. The 1982
amendment to the Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act made it possible for out-
of-state BHCs to acquire failed banks. By that time, nearly half of all 51 states
allowed state-wide branching through mergers and acquisitions (cf. Stiroh and
Strahan, 2003, for an overview of the years in which restrictions were lifted).
The second step involved the passing of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, allowing nation-wide reallocation by the end
of 1995 (Berger et al., 1995). The starting date of our sample (1995) allows us to
consider the period immediately following these deregulations.
Similarly, Europe’s national banking markets have been integrated in one
market for financial services as of 1993, with the enactment of the Second
Banking Coordination Directive of 1988. This Directive established the single
banking license, allowing all European banks to set up branches in the entire
EU area. Allthough Bos and Schmiedel (2007) find empirical support for a
single European banking market, characterized by cost and profit meta-frontiers,
Berger et al. (1999) argue that institutional and cultural differences still impede
cross-border reallocation. Indeed, cross-border mergers are rare in the European
Union, compared to cross-state mergers in the US. Nevertheless, the possibilities
to open cross-border branches and subsidiaries exists in the European Union,
and whether reallocation is hampered by the lack of mergers remains to be seen.
Both markets, after all, have experienced an increase in concentration, due to
increasing merger activity, entry and exit over a period of twelve years (1997-
2009). In Figure 1, we plot the development of consolidation, considering
only independent banks or bank holding companies. Figure 1 shows that the
Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) of both geographical banking sectors has
increased over time, indicating larger and fewer banks.9 Although the overall
distribution of assets is much less skewed in Europe, we observe that the overall
pattern is remarkably similar, even when the US temporarily experienced a
decrease in concentration after the Interstate Banking and Branching Act.
Traditionally, increases in concentration of this magnitude have been associ-
ated with decreases in competition. However, there is also evidence that in-
creased concentration need not be related to actual competition, as documented
by e.g. Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Bos et al. (2010) for the banking industry.
Furthermore, on local markets (or Metropolitan Statistical Areas), which are still
the relevant markets for small business and household financial services, the
HHI has been constant over the last twenty years (Kwast, 2007). Park and Pen-
nacchi (2009) attribute this to the fact that banks have expanded geographically,
with large banks accessing local markets by acquiring community banks. Their
8Deregulation and technological changes have been well documented for the banking industry (Rose, 1987;
Berger et al., 1999; Perotti and Suarez, 2002; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Frame and White, 2004; Kwast, 2007).
9In constructing figure 1, we use data from the Call reports in the US, detailed in section III.C, and data
from the EU reports on banking structures (European Central Bank, 2004, 2006, 2010).
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model and empirical findings illustrate that small business loan rates tend to
decline, indicating more competition, while deposit rates are lowered as well,
mimicking less competition.
Moreover, the restructuring process is not finished. The financial crisis that
started in 2007 urged politicians and policymakers to plea for a revision of
the regulatory framework, which will most likely lead to a new era of tighter
regulation. This will in turn lead to new restructuring incentives.
Our focus, therefore is on quantifying the productivity effects of market re-
structuring. What are the productivity developments in markets that experience
such an increase in concentration? To what extent do all firms go through a
similar process after the deregulation, and to what extent do market dynamics
play a role? Do the fittest survive, or perhaps not? To answer these questions, we
first need a coherent framework for studying firm and industry developments
in productivity.
III. Methodology and data
In this section, we explain how we measure the productivity of banks, and the
productivity of the banking sector. We also explain how the two relate to each
other, and what data we use to capture banks’ production sets.
The way we typically think about productivity is as an output-input ratio.
The main concept is best illustrated for a single-input, single-output firm, a
feature which we generalize below. Let Y denote an output, and X denote an
input, which are related using the production function Yt = Ft(Xt). Productivity
can then be defined as Πt = YtXt . Using this concept, productivity growth (in
logarithms) can be written as:
(1) ∆ lnΠt = ln
Yt
Yt−1
− ln Xt
Xt−1
.
Suppose that, due to technical change, the production function shifts out over
time (holding inputs fixed), that is, Ft(Xt) = αtFt−1(Xt), where αt denotes the
growth factor. Moreover, let γt ∈ (0, 1) denote the productive efficiency of the
firm, such that Yt = γtFt(Xt). Introducing these features into our measure of
productivity growth, we obtain
(2) ∆ lnΠt = ln αt
γt
γt−1
Ft−1(Xt)
Ft−1(Xt−1)
− ln Xt
Xt−1
Finally, let F(X) be homogeneous of degree k, such that Ft(ptXt) = pkt F(Xt),
where pt > 0 represents the input growth factor. Using this definition in
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equation (2), we obtain:
∆ lnΠt = ln αt
γt
γt−1
pkt Ft−1(Xt−1)
Ft−1(Xt−1)
− ln ptXt−1
Xt−1
= ln αt + ∆ lnγt + (k− 1) ln XtXt−1 .
(3)
Equation (3) represents a key element of our approach. Productivity growth,
defined as the growth of an output-input ratio, equals the sum of technical
change, changes in technical efficiency and returns to scale in production. The
remainder of this section generalizes this simple concept into a multiple-output
multiple-input setting, using a more flexible representation of the production
technology.
A. Firm productivity dynamics
We start with a model of the production of the firm. The key elements of
our model include the multi-input/multi-output nature of banking and possible
inefficiencies in transforming inputs into outputs. We therefore first need to
define the way we capture a bank’s production technology. Subsequently, we
explain the way in which we estimate banks’ production function. And then we
demonstrate the derivation of a bank-specific productivity index.
TECHNOLOGY
Let x ∈ RJ+ denote the vector of J inputs, and y ∈ RM+ denote the vector of
M outputs. The technology10 is described by the set of feasible output vectors
producible from xt, that is,
(4) P t(xt) = {yt : yt is producible from xt}.
The outer boundary of the set P t(xt) represents the technological frontier.
The output distance function measures the distance between outputs and the
technological frontier, and is defined as the minimum deflator of the output
vector, keeping the input vector fixed:
(5) Do(xt,yt) = min
Ψ
{
Ψ > 0 :
yt
Ψ
∈ P t(xt)
}
.
The output distance function is non-decreasing, positively linearly homoge-
neous and convex in y, and decreasing in x (Fa¨re and Primont, 1995). The
value of the output distance function, Do(xt,yt), places y/Do(xt,yt) on the
outer boundary of P t(xt) and on the ray through yt. Moreover, this value is
10We assume that the technology satisfies the axioms listed in Fa¨re and Primont (1995).
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the inverse of the output-oriented Farrell (1957) measure of technical efficiency,
defined as the maximum feasible radial expansion of the output vector, holding
inputs fixed:
(6) max
λ
{
λ ≥ 1 : λ · yt ∈ P t(xt)} .
Making use of equation (6), and allowing for a stochastic element in equation
(5), we let v denote a random error term capturing statistical noise, measurement
errors and unobservable factors. The stochastic technological frontier can now
be written as:
(7) Do(xt,λyt) · exp(vt) = 1.
Homogeneity of the output distance function in outputs implies that, for any
scalar µ > 0, Do(xt, µλyt) = µDo(xt,λyt). We impose homogeneity by setting
µ = 1λ·y1 , and normalize all outputs by the first output. Hence, letting y˜ =(
y2
y1
, ..., yMy1
)
denote the M− 1 vector of output ratio’s, without loss of generality
we can write our regression model as:
1 = λ · yt1 · Do(xt, y˜) · exp(vt);
− ln yt1 = ln Do(xt, y˜) + ut + vt,
(8)
where ut = lnλ ≥ 0 denotes technical inefficiency. As in Cuesta and Orea (2002),
we use the value of the distance function as our measure of technical efficiency,
which is restricted to lie between 0 and 1, with greater values denoting higher
efficiency. The result is a model that allows us to estimate scale economies,
technical change and efficiency while accounting for a multi input/multi output
setting. The next step involves specifying a functional form for Do, so we can
estimate the output distance frontier model.
SPECIFICATION
In order to estimate the model described by equation (8), we again follow
Cuesta and Orea (2002) and adopt the standard flexible translog functional
form for the output distance function, including time to account for non-neutral
technical change. Letting i index firms and t index time, equation 8 can be
9
written as:
− ln y1it = αi +
M
∑
m=2
αm ln y˜mit +
1
2
M
∑
m=2
M
∑
n=2
αmn ln y˜mit ln y˜nit +
J
∑
j=1
β j ln xjit
+
1
2
J
∑
j=1
J
∑
k=1
β jk ln xjit ln xkit +
M
∑
m=2
J
∑
j=1
δmj ln y˜mit ln xjit
+ τ0 t +
1
2
τ1 t2 +
M
∑
m=2
τm t ln y˜mit +
J
∑
j=1
ζ j t ln xjit + uit + vit,
(9)
where symmetry requires amn = anm and bjk = bkj. In this specification, αi
denotes a bank fixed-effect and uit denotes the technical inefficiency of firm i in
year t, and is assumed to be a draw from a half-normal distribution with variance
σ2u . The specification in equation (9) allows for an unrestricted path of efficiency
over time.11 Finally, vit is a normally distributed iid error term, independent
of uit, with mean zero and variance σ2v . We estimate equation (9) by maximum
likelihood.
PRODUCTIVITY INDEX
Estimating the process with which banks transform inputs into outputs is only
a first step. The next, logical step is to use the resulting production function
estimations to create a productivity index. In short, we wish to know how each
bank becomes more (or less) productive. We follow Orea (2002), and define a
total factor productivity index as:
(10) ∆TFPt+1 =
1
2
M
∑
m=1
(
et+1m + e
t
m
)
ln
(
yt+1m
ytm
)
− 1
2
J
∑
j=1
(
et+1j + e
t
j
)
ln
(
xt+1j
xtj
)
,
where etm =
∂ ln Do(xt,yt,t)
∂ ln ym and e
t
j =
∂ ln Do(xt ,yt ,t)
∂ ln xj
∑Jk=1
∂ ln Do(xt ,yt ,t)
∂ ln xk
. ∆TFPt+1 is thus defined as
the growth rate of outputs minus the growth rate of inputs, where outputs
and inputs are weighted by their respective output distance elasticities. Note
the similarity of how ∆TFP is computed compared to equation (1) in the
single-output single-input case. Furthermore, using Diewert (1976)’s Quadratic
Identity Lemma, the TFP index can be decomposed into changes in technical
efficiency (∆TE), technical change (TC) and returns to scale (SC) , where:12
11Our specification for inefficiency differs from Cuesta and Orea (2002), who impose a common path of
inefficiency for all banks. As efficiency changes are important for our application, we prefer not to impose any
common time trends.
12There are many decompositions suggested in the literature, differing with respect to how technical
change and returns to scale are measured. See e.g.,Fa¨re et al. (1994), Ray and Desli (1997) and Lovell (2003).
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∆TE = ln Do(xt+1,yt+1, t + 1)− ln Do(xt,yt, t)(11a)
TC = −1
2
(
∂ ln Do(xt+1,yt+1, t + 1)
∂t
+
∂ ln Do(xt,yt, t)
∂t
)
(11b)
SC = −1
2
N
∑
k=1
((
N
∑
j=1
∂ ln Do(xt+1,yt+1, t + 1)
∂ ln xj
+ 1
)
et+1k
+
(
N
∑
j=1
∂ ln Do(xt,yt, t)
∂ ln xj
+ 1
)
etk
)
ln
(
xt+1n
xtn
)
,(11c)
and:
(12) ∆TFP = ∆TE + TC + SC.
Note that both ∆TFP as well as its components in equation (12) vary between
firms and over time, and can be obtained directly from the fitted output
distance function. To see why the first term measures the change in effi-
ciency, note that, from taking logs of expression (7) in two subsequent periods,
ln Do(xt+1,yt+1, t+ 1)− ln Do(xt,yt, t) = −(ut+1− ut), and hence the change in
the value of the output distance function measures the negative of the change in
inefficiency. The second term measures the negative of the change in the distance
function over time, which, by definition, equals the shifting of the technological
frontier. Finally, the scale term reflects reflects the effects of movements of the
bank along the distance function, changing their input levels over time. For
constant returns to scale, ∑Jk=1 ∂ ln Do(·)/∂ ln xk = −1, and hence SC = 0, while
for increasing returns, ∑Jk=1 ∂ ln Do(·)/∂ ln xk < −1) and SC > 0. Positive
changes in technical efficiency, technical progress and increasing returns to scale
are thus contributing to productivity growth. Again, we note the similarity of
this decomposition with that obtained in equation (3).
Finally, to construct a measure of the level of productivity, we use the estimated
TFP growth series and compute:
Πit = Πit−1 + ∆TFPit , t = 2, ... , T;(13a)
Πi1 =
M
∑
m=1
emi1 ln ymi1 −
J
∑
j=1
eji1 ln xji1.(13b)
We use expression (13b) to compute productivity in the first period, which is
Here, we follow Lovell (2003), who recommends the above decomposition based on its ability to mimic
an 'ideal' decomposition of productivity growth. Moreover, in practice, the difference between the various
decompositions are minor in empirical applications.
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consistent with the definition of TFP.13 Now that we have thus a estimated firm-
level measure of productivity, we can turn to industry-level developments of
productivity.
B. Industry productivity dynamics
To study productivity dynamics in the banking sector, we opt for a decom-
position model of sector-level productivity. The goal of our decomposition
analysis is to explain industry-wide growth by focusing on firm-specific behav-
ior. The decomposition method explicitly accounts for heterogeneity in firm
performance and may prove particularly insightful in restructuring industries
(Foster et al., 2001, 2006). Decomposition methods are mainly used in studies
of the manufacturing industries (Dunne et al., 1989, Baily et al., 1992, Olley and
Pakes, 1996, Collard-Wexler and de Loecker, 2013). The decomposition allows
us to differentiate between within-firm growth and growth due to creative
destruction, as some firms lose market share while others gain.
Following Olley and Pakes (1996), we define industry-wide productivity as
the market share weighted average of productivity levels, Πt = ∑Ii=1 Πitθit.
14
Productivity growth between two consecutive time periods equals:
(14) ∆Πt =
It
∑
i=1
Πitθit −
It−1
∑
i=1
Πit−1θit−1.
The market share of firm i in year t, θit, is defined as the share of total industry
inputs allocated to firm i.15 Over time, the number of firms may change from It−1
to It. Between any two periods, we can identify entering firms N, present only in
period t, exiting firms X, present only in t− 1 and surviving firms S, which are
present in t and t− 1. Hence, It−1 = S+X and It = S+N. Rearranging equation
(14), and following Foster et al. (2001), we derive the following decomposition
of productivity growth, the derivation of which is presented in Appendix A:
13However, when using a firm fixed effect in subsequent regression analyses, this starting value is
immaterial.
14An emerging literature considers the aggregation of TFP indices to industry-wide levels (cf. Basu and
Fernald, 2002; Fa¨re and Grosskopf, 2003; Ten Raa, 2005). Due to allocative inefficiency, the productivity of the
industry is not necessarily the same as the sum of firm-level productivity levels. We are well aware of this
notion, and mainly view the weighted average as an indicator of the industry’s performance.
15The choice of activity weights has been discussed in the literature, cf. Collard-Wexler and de Loecker
(2013). We believe total imputs is a better measure of activity for the demand-driven banking sector. However,
all our results are robust to using total assets for computing market shares. In fact, the correlation between the
two is above 0.9 in our data.
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∆Πt =∑
i∈S
(Πit −Πit−1)θit−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
within effect
+∑
i∈S
(Πit −Πt−1) (θit − θit−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
between effect
+
∑
i∈N
(Πit −Πt−1)θit︸ ︷︷ ︸
entry effect
−∑
i∈X
(Πit−1 −Πt−1)θit−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
exit effect
.
(15)
The within effect measures how firm-level changes in the survivor’s produc-
tivity contribute to industry-wide performance growth. Using our earlier firm-
level productivity decompositions, we can decompose the within effect further
into contributions from improved technical efficiency, technical progress and
increasing returns to scale. Using expression (12), we obtain:
(16) ∑
i∈S
(Πit −Πit−1)θit−1 = ∑
i∈S
(∆TEit + TCit + SCit)θit−1.
The remaining terms in expression (15) measure the dynamics between indus-
try participants. In a given period, firms can increase or decrease their inputs,
relative to other firms, changing the share of the surviving firms. We call the
resulting changes in productivity the between effect. Furthermore, entry and
exit of banks can also influence productivity of the industry. Together, entry,
exit and the between effect determine the size and sign of the reallocation effect.
This reallocation effect will be positive if above-average productive firms grow
in size (of expenditures) or enter, thereby contributing positively to industry-
level productivity. Alternatively, if below-average firms decrease or exit the
market, industry-wide productivity will increase as well. The reallocation effect
therefore quantifies the degree of restructuring in the banking sector. Note
that the within effect has a nice counterfactual interpretation: it shows what
aggregate productivity would have been in the absence of reallocation. The
remaining terms then measure what productivity would have been without
changes in the distribution of productivity.
Summing up, we have now decomposed industry-level productivity changes
into firm-level contributions and reallocation effects, stemming from industry
restructuring.
C. Data
In order to properly assess the role of reallocation in driving productivity
change in the banking sectors of Europe and the US, we first need to carefully
consider the sample of banks included in our study.
We only include independent banks, in order to properly measure reallocation
between banks, rather than within banks or between banks that are part of the
same holding company. For the US, we use the Federal Reserve Call reports
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(for independent banks) and Y9-C reports (for bank holding companies), and
include all banks that are either independent and not part of a bank holding
company or are the largest entity of a bank holding company.16 For Europe, we
use Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database. Again, we select only independent
banks, relying on BankScope’s Independence indicator.17
The resulting data set is unbalanced as, for various reasons, not all banks are
covered in the entire period. Only commercial, cooperative and savings banks
are included, as these banks are more or less homogeneous in terms of financing
structure. In total, we include 3,313 bank-year observations for Europe, and
6,184 for the US, where many more small banks have so far survived.
Table 1—: Descriptive statistics
variable Europe US
pr
od
uc
ti
on
se
t loans (Y1) 12,581,635 (51,754,604) 2,916,294 (24,164,706)
investments (Y2) 13,034,517 (77,738,824) 1,036,701 (8,774,426)
off-balance sheet (Y3) 177,275 (854,359) 92,532 (866,767)
labor (X1) 208,405 (965,436) 65,689 (565,239)
financial capital (X2) 699,588 (3,225,495) 104,951 (981,383)
physical capital (X3) 373,847 (1,711,405) 18,806 (164,015)
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
scale elasticity 0.851 (0.014) 0.730 (0.031)
efficiency 0.891 (0.063) 0.889 (0.056)
productivity growth (∆TFP) 0.024 (0.136) 0.009 0.161
productivity (Π) 2.286 0.737 2.474 0.445
market share 0.453 (1.492) 0.243 (1.839)
Lerner 0.457 (0.165) 0.477 (0.674)
observations 3,313 6,184
Note: X1 is measured using personnel expenses; X2 using total interest expenses; and X3 using overhead
expenses, including write-offs on physical capital. All outputs and inputs as well as operating profits in 1995
PPP dollars. Market share is in percentages.
Now that we have selected our sample, next on our agenda is the selection of
each bank’s production set. We follow the literature, and use the intermediation
approach popularized by Sealey and Lindley (1977). We identify three outputs:
loans, investments and off-balance sheet items. In addition, we identify three
inputs: labor, funds and physical capital. Our main concern at this point, is
to measure each item in a consistent manner across different banks in different
markets. We measure all inputs and outputs in monetary terms. The inputs are
measured as flows: personnel expenses, total interest expenses and overhead
16For banks that are not part of a bank holding company, we use call report items RSSD9365 and RSSD9349
to exclude those that have an outside equity holder with a majority position. For the remaining banks, item
RSSD9397 is used to identify a bank as the largest entity of a bank holding company.
17We include all banks with an Independence indicator score of A or B. Banks with an indicator score of
A have no shareholder with direct or total ownership exceeding 25%. Banks with a score of B can have a
known recorded shareholder with an ownership above 25%, but have no shareholders with a direct or total
(via cross-holdings) ownership above 50%.
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expenses (including write-offs on physical capital), respectively. Two of the
outputs are measured as end-of-year stocks, namely loans (net of impaired
loans) and investments (consisting of all other earning assets). The remaining
output, off-balance sheet items, is measured using net fees and commissions, a
flow.
The full production set is described in the top part of Table 1. From the
table, we observe that European banks are on average much larger. With their
dense branch networks, they also spend proportionally more on physical capital.
US banks, on the other hand, earn proportionally more from off-balance sheet
operations.
In our analysis of the sources and consequences of productivity changes in
both markets, we make use of a number of additional variables, described in the
bottom part of Table 1. First, we include our estimates of banks’ scale elasticity
and efficiency. In terms of the notation in section III, the scale elasticity at time t
is defined as SE = −∑Jj=1 ∂ ln Do(x
t,yt,t)
∂ ln xtj
. Thus, SE = 1 indicates constant returns,
while SE < 1 denote decreasing returns to scale. We observe that on average,
both in Europe and in the US, banks experience decreasing returns to scale.
Returns to scale are significantly lower in the US, which may play an important
role in the reallocation process. Efficiency, meanwhile, is remarkably similar in
both markets: an efficiency score of approximately 0.89 means that the average
bank could produce 11% more outputs for a given input mix.
Reflecting the highly skewed size distribution of banks in the US, we observe
that the average market share of the US banks is much lower than that of the
European banks, even though concentration is higher in the former market. The
market shares are calculated based on total inputs. The European banks are
pooled together, so that the market share of each firm measures its size in the
total European banking sector. We consider this to be the 'fair' comparison of
European and US banks, as both - in principal - are supposed to operate on
markets that are internally open.18
Finally, we measure banks’ markup using the Lerner index, constructed as
the sum of net operating income and expenses on premises and fixed assets
(measuring fixed costs) over total operating income. Banks in Europe and the US
appear to have, on average, very similar Lerner indices, cautiously suggesting
that there are perhaps no drastic differences in the level of competition in both
markets.
IV. Results
In this section, we describe our results. We start by describing productivity
levels, and introduce our main parameter estimates and the resulting productiv-
ity measures. Next, we analyze the resulting productivity dynamics, and study
18All analyses in this paper have also been conducted for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom
separately. Findings as presented here are robust, and these additional results are available upon request.
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how each bank market has fared over our sample period. Subsequently, we
investigate the importance of reallocation in driving these dynamics. Finally, we
explore the long-run dynamics in both markets.
A. Productivity levels
We start by estimating our output distance stochastic frontier model specified
in equation (9) for both markets. The estimation results are summarized in Table
2. Interpreting individual coefficient estimates is notoriously difficult with these
translog estimations. Instead, therefore, we describe the main features of our
results by inspecting a number of key parameters.
First, we are interested in the importance of efficiency. From the estimations in
Table 2, we note that λ is significantly larger than zero. For Europe, a λ of slightly
more than 2 implies that the amount of residual variance that can be attributed
to inefficiency is twice as large as the amount of noise. For the US, this value is
somewhat lower, but still considerable, at 1.599. These inferences are confirmed
by a likelihood ratio test of whether σ2u , the variance attributable to inefficiency,
is significantly larger than zero, which is the case in both markets.
Second, of course, we are interested in the level of efficiency and scale
economies, and their variance. After all, the potential for reallocation increases
as the differences in efficiency and scale economies increase (Melitz, 2003).
Figures 2a and 2b show kernel density plots of bank-level estimates of the scale
elasticity in the US and Europe, respectively.
Two observations stand out: (i) the elasticity of scale is lower in the US in all
sample years, and (ii) both regions witness an increase in the elasticity of scale
over time. Due to both geographical and product-mix expansion, banks appear
to become more able to produce outputs at given input levels.
Figures 2c and 2d show kernel density plots of bank-level estimates of
efficiency in the US and Europe, respectively. For Europe, we observe a
development that is similar to what we find for scale economies: over time, ef-
ficiency improves, and its distribution becomes (slightly) narrower, as efficiency
differences disappear. For the US, the story is different: from the outset, the
spread in efficiency is much less than is the case in Europe, and there is no clear
time pattern.
In fact, Figure 2 nicely illustrates the contribution of this paper: by merely
looking at aggregate numbers (or in this case, distributions), we can infer
very little about the underlying dynamics that may drive industry productivity
changes.
B. Productivity dynamics
We now turn to describing the evolution of productivity change in both
markets. Table 3 shows the results of decomposing the year-on-year growth of
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Table 2—: Frontier results
Europe US
ln y2 0.058 (0.032)* 0.173 (0.025)***
ln y3 0.776 (0.044)*** 0.608 (0.040)***
1
2 × ln y2 × ln y2 0.082 (0.003)*** 0.039 (0.002)***
ln y2 × ln y3 -0.055 (0.003)*** 0.009 (0.003)***
1
2 × ln y3 × ln y3 0.124 (0.005)*** 0.050 (0.005)***
ln x1 0.333 (0.132)** -0.154 (0.100)
ln x2 -0.194 (0.038)*** -0.200 (0.038)***
ln x3 -1.024 (0.146)*** -0.374 (0.081)***
1
2 × ln x1 × ln x1 0.327 (0.059)*** -0.082 (0.034)**
ln x1 × ln x2 0.051 (0.018)*** -0.017 (0.014)
ln x1 × ln x3 -0.391 (0.047)*** 0.076 (0.023)***
1
2 × ln x2 × ln x2 -0.014 (0.006)** 0.017 (0.008)**
ln x2 × ln x3 -0.035 (0.020)* 0.004 (0.011)
1
2 × ln x3 × ln x3 0.442 (0.042)*** -0.067 (0.019)***
ln y2 × ln x1 -0.092 (0.012)*** -0.001 (0.009)
ln y2 × ln x2 -0.031 (0.004)*** 0.013 (0.004)***
ln y2 × ln x3 0.123 (0.013)*** -0.010 (0.008)
ln y3 × ln x1 0.066 (0.015)*** 0.019 (0.011)
ln y3 × ln x2 0.033 (0.005)*** -0.006 (0.005)
ln y3 × ln x3 -0.101 (0.016)*** -0.037 (0.010)***
t 0.012 (0.006)* -0.026 (0.007)***
1
2 × t× t 0.002 (0.000)*** 0.004 (0.000)***
ln y2 × t -0.005 (0.001)*** 0.003 (0.001)***
ln y3 × t 0.009 (0.001)*** 0.000 (0.001)
ln x1 × t -0.001 (0.004) -0.004 (0.002)*
ln x2 × t 0.013 (0.001)*** 0.004 (0.001)***
ln x3 × t -0.015 (0.004)*** -0.003 (0.002)*
constant -3.129 (0.392)*** -3.892 (0.244)***
λ 2.029*** 1.599***
LRTu=0 0.000*** 0.000***
observations 3,313 6,184
Note: Dependent variable is − ln y1. λ = σu/σv, and measure the relative magnitude of inefficiency and noise.
LRTu=0 is a likelihood ratio test, with a null hypothesis that σ2u = 0 and an alternative hypothesis that σ2u > 0.
We report the p-values corresponding to the test.
sector-wide productivity (final column labeled total) into within-firm changes
(column within) and between-firm changes in market shares (column real,
short for reallocation). Moreover, the reallocation effect is decomposed into its
components identified in equation (15), and the within effect is decomposed into
its components identified in equation (16).
The top panel of Table 3 describes the evolution of productivity in Europe. For
instance, the first row shows that, between 1995 and 1996, the banking sector
became 7.4% more productive, on aggregate. 4.8%, or about two-thirds, is due to
banks becoming more productive, which in turn is almost fully due to technical
progress (4.2%). The remaining 2.6% is due to market share reallocation. Note
that, absent entry, the least productive banks gained market shares; rather,
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Figure 2. : Distributions of efficiency and scale elasticities
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Note: Kernel density plots, based on estimations in Table 2.
the entry of banks with a productivity premium yields a positive reallocation
effect. In fact, until 2008, the between effect is typically negative, indicating
that, between surviving banks, market shares are reallocated to less productive
banks. Rather, it is the reshaping of the banking sector via the external margin
(entry or exit) that mostly affects reallocation. We also note that the within-firm
component (holding market shares fixed) is steadily contributing to productivity
growth, with technical change as the most important driver.
In the US, in contrast, we observe that the internal margin plays a more
important role: the between-survivors effect is mostly positive. Entrants have
a productivity disadvantage during the first part of our sample, causing the
reallocation effect to be mostly negative. During the first part of our sample,
within-firm growth was strong, while pre-crisis, productivity levels declined.
Overall, the US banking sector became more productive during the sample
18
Table 3—: Decomposition results
year within ∆TE SC TC between entry exit real total
Eu
ro
pe
1996 0.048 0.006 0.001 0.042 -0.018 0.045 0.001 0.026 0.074
1997 0.064 0.023 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.086 0.150
1998 0.033 0.003 -0.004 0.034 -0.038 0.025 -0.148 0.135 0.168
1999 0.073 0.032 0.001 0.040 -0.023 -0.019 0.000 -0.043 0.030
2000 -0.019 -0.041 -0.012 0.034 -0.040 -0.003 0.000 -0.043 -0.062
2001 0.006 -0.011 -0.015 0.032 -0.010 -0.038 -0.002 -0.046 -0.040
2002 0.028 0.006 -0.011 0.032 0.019 0.054 0.029 0.044 0.072
2003 0.057 0.020 0.004 0.034 -0.007 0.031 -0.032 0.055 0.112
2004 0.048 0.015 -0.001 0.034 -0.043 -0.154 0.000 -0.197 -0.149
2005 0.068 0.037 -0.010 0.041 -0.047 -0.013 0.000 -0.060 0.008
2006 -0.037 -0.055 -0.020 0.038 0.012 -0.033 0.000 -0.021 -0.059
2007 0.014 -0.011 -0.007 0.033 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 -0.006 0.008
2008 0.035 0.004 0.002 0.029 0.037 -0.003 0.004 0.030 0.065
2009 0.040 0.002 0.008 0.029 -0.021 0.005 0.000 -0.016 0.024
U
S
1996 0.017 -0.016 -0.016 0.049 0.001 -0.032 0.016 -0.047 -0.030
1997 0.058 0.068 -0.069 0.058 0.024 -0.002 0.008 0.014 0.071
1998 -0.033 -0.011 -0.069 0.047 0.004 -0.058 -0.034 -0.021 -0.054
1999 0.021 0.003 -0.042 0.060 0.014 -0.084 -0.005 -0.065 -0.044
2000 0.050 -0.011 0.003 0.058 0.035 -0.003 -0.001 0.033 0.083
2001 -0.007 -0.046 -0.016 0.055 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.005
2002 0.063 0.011 0.000 0.052 0.008 -0.004 -0.006 0.010 0.073
2003 0.047 -0.001 -0.002 0.050 0.018 -0.001 -0.006 0.022 0.069
2004 0.039 0.009 -0.015 0.045 0.014 0.006 0.004 0.016 0.055
2005 -0.073 -0.089 -0.027 0.043 0.037 0.014 -0.001 0.052 -0.021
2006 -0.016 -0.024 -0.025 0.033 0.007 0.009 0.016 -0.001 -0.016
2007 -0.038 -0.063 -0.005 0.031 -0.008 0.022 0.044 -0.030 -0.068
2008 0.016 -0.002 -0.013 0.031 -0.001 0.010 -0.005 0.013 0.030
2009 0.177 0.132 0.017 0.028 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.179
Note: Columns within, between, entry and exit refer to equation (15). The reallocation effect equals
real=between+entry-exit. Columns ∆TE, SC and TC refer to equation (16). The total effect equals within+real.
period.
Figures 3a and 3b plot the evolution of productivity, the within effect and
the reallocation effect in the US and Europe. All graphs are cumulative effects
over the sample period. Figure 3b shows more clearly how both reallocation
of market shares and bank-level growth contributed to productivity growth in
Europe during the first half of the sample. In later years, productivity growth
slows down due to negative reallocation effects, despite continuous within-firm
growth. The US banking sector is characterized by a steady rate of productivity
growth, due to a strong positive productivity trend at the bank level. Market
share reallocation has contributed negatively throughout, converging to zero
towards the end of our sample. In total, these results imply an increase in
productivity over the period 1995-2009, on the order of 11% in the US and 19%
in Europe.19
19We compute these as (Π2009 −Π1995)/Π1995.
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Figure 3. : Developments in productivity
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Note: Decomposition analysis based on results in Table 3.
Figures 3c and 3d document the development of the cumulative within-firm
components. In both the US and Europe, technical change is the most important
driver of growth, while changes in efficiency do not have any effect on growth.
A main difference between the two regions concerns the returns to scale: the
US banking sector is characterized by decreasing returns to scale, while slightly
decreasing or constant returns to scale is more appropriate for European banks.
Decreasing returns implies a less-than-proportionate increase in outputs when
scaling up inputs, and hence depresses within-firm productivity growth in the
US.
C. Reallocation analysis
What are the drivers of reallocation in banking? From previous research, we
know that factors such as deregulation, trade openness and product or process
20
innovation are important for long-term outcomes in manufacturing studies
(Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). More recently, Collard-Wexler and de Loecker
(2013) identify the introduction of an alternative way to produce steel, the
minimill, as a major determinant of how the US steel industry looks today, by
reallocating resources to the technologically superior minimill, coupled with
more competition. Here, we quantify the importance for reallocation of two,
related factors: bank size and market power.
The reallocation-size relationship is interesting, as it can pin down why we
observe positive or negative effects of reallocation. If big banks gain market
share and are more productive, reallocation will contribute to industry growth.
We emphasize that no such relationship is imposed: the reallocation effect
measures the contribution of changes in market share on productivity. We relate
the bank-level reallocation effects to initial market share using a flexible fixed-
effects regression. In particular, we estimate the following model separately for
the US and Europe:
1
(i∈St)
[(Πit −Πt−1) (∆θit)] +
1
(i∈Nt)
[(Πit −Πt−1)∆θit]−
1
(i∈Xt)
[(Πit−1 −Πt−1)∆θit−1]
≡ Rit = γ0 + γ1θit−1 + γ2θ2it−1 + γ3θ3it−1 + fi + vit.
(17)
In equation (17), 1 [·] denotes the indicator function, Rit denotes a bank-level
reallocation effect, obtained by summing the between effect, entry effect and
exit effect, fi denotes a bank fixed effect and vit the error term. It is understood
that market shares for entering and exiting banks are zero in the relevant period.
We obtain this specification by testing down a flexible polynomial regression
model.20 Note that the fixed effect solves the initial conditions problem for
converting the TFP growth series into TFP levels, as explained in section III.
Figures 4a and 4b show the implied relationship between reallocation and
lagged market share, together with a 95% confidence bound. Figure 4a clearly
shows why the reallocation effect has been mostly negative in the US: large
banks have lost market shares while being more productive,21 driving the
industry-level reallocation effect to become negative. Smaller banks have
contributed positively to the reallocation effect, but the effect is smaller, yielding
a negative effect.
In contrast, Figure 4b shows a very different pattern: large banks have positive
reallocation effects, while small banks contribute negatively to growth. As
20Time fixed effects turned out insignificant, and are excluded from the equation.
21Inspection of the data reveals that large banks have, on average, lost, rather than gained, market share.
Results available upon request.
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Figure 4. : Reallocation effects
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(c) US: Reallocation and market power
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Note: Figures 4a and 4b are fitted from polynomial regression, with 95% confidence bounds. Figures 4c and
4d include linear fits based on plotted values.
Figure 3b shows, this pattern yields a positive aggregate reallocation effect
during the first sample years. The difference in the reallocation-size pattern
can thus explain why, on aggregate, the reshuffling of market shares contributes
positively to growth in Europe during the first years, and slightly negative in the
US.
Finally, we consider the reallocation-market power relationship. We use a
Lerner index to measure market power. Note that the Lerner index as defined
is essentially scale-free, thus not picking up the reallocation-size relationship
investigated above. Collard-Wexler and de Loecker (2013) find that reallocation
and competition are related, with increased competition (measured by share-
weighted markups) resulting in more reallocation, at the industry level. We
follow their approach, and compute a share-weighted Lerner index as Lt =
∑Ni=1 Litθit. Figures 4c and 4d plot the industry-level reallocation effect at time t
22
against the share-weighted Lerner index at time t− 1, i.e. 1 observation per year.
The results suggest a decreasing relationship in Europe, signalling a positive
competition-reallocation nexus, while the reverse is true for the US. Obviously,
the result is suggestive of an association; identifying a causal relationship is a
much harder task.22 Taken at face value, coupled with the finding that the share-
weighted Lerner index has increased over time (paralleling the HHI, see Figure
1), the result suggests that reallocation has been lower during the second part
of the sample in Europe due to an decrease in market power. Similarly, the US
banking sector has gained from decreased competition over time, by stimulating
reallocation of market shares towards more productive banks.
D. Productivity developments over longer horizons
Up until now, we have investigated productivity developments and its compo-
nents using annual data. One issue with this approach is that short-run and long-
run adjustments are mingled together: a bank restructuring its activities in an
effort to become more productive may well suffer from temporary productivity
losses, showing up as a negative productivity development. In other words, the
gains (or losses) from restructuring which realize in later years are not attributed
to reallocation. In an attempt to study productivity over longer horizons, we
divide the sample into two periods, with the year 2002 as the dividing year. In
particular, we pretend to observe the banking sectors only in the years 1995, 2002
and 2009. We study the growth in productivity by comparing the banking sector
in 2002 with that of 1995, and similarly for the second period.23 Table 4 shows
the development of productivity, as well as the within and reallocation effect,
over these longer horizons.24
Several observations stand out from Table 4. First, especially in the US, we
observe the larger role of efficiency improvements in explaining within-firm
growth. Although this may seem surprising given that the efficiency distribution
appears to be stable in the US (see Figure 2), it shows the importance of looking at
micro-level changes rather than focusing only on moments of distributions, an
approach we have taken throughout. Technical change remains the dominant
driving force in Europe. Second, in the US, the reallocation effect is positive;
22While a similar relationship could in principle be estimated using bank-level data, it requires a credible
strategy for inference as the Lerner index is likely to be endogenous, as some banks may have acquired more
market share by exploiting market power. Of course, identifying a causal effect of competition on reallocation
is an interesting example of future research.
23We use the same estimated output distance function to calculate our measure of productivity; differences
in bank-level productivity are therefore not driving these results.
24Showing cumulative reallocation effects, as we do in Figure 3, does not alleviate the problem of attributing
long-run gains to within-firm growth rather than between-firm growth. Specifically, it is easy to show that the
cumulative between effect for periods t and t + 1 equals the long-run between effect, ∑i(Pit+1 − Pt−1)(sit+1 −
sit−1), which we calculate here, minus ∑i(Pit+1 − Pit)(sit − sit−1). The last term can be interpreted as a next-
period performance effect of current changes in market share. Therefore, relative to the cumulative results,
the long-run effects in Table 4 attribute these long-run gains (or losses) to the reallocation effect, rather than
the within effect. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this deficiency in an earlier version.
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Table 4—: Long run effects
period within ∆TE ∆SC ∆TC real total
EU
95-02 0.272 0.049 0.002 0.221 0.120 0.392
02-09 0.127 -0.015 0.004 0.138 -0.118 0.010
U
S 95-02 0.009 -0.011 0.008 0.019 0.086 0.095
02-09 0.156 0.118 0.015 0.039 0.072 0.228
hence, over these 7-year periods, under-performing banks lose market share.
The change in the composition of the banking sectors, together with productivity
improvements within surviving banks, yields a more productive sector in the
US. In Europe, reallocation gives higher productivity only in the first half of our
sample; this effect is undone in the second half. The results in the US are in
line with the findings in manufacturing studies, see e.g. Bartelsman and Doms
(2000), where the creative destruction margin is found to play a large role.
Finally, Table 4 clearly shows that most of the productivity gains in Europe are
realized in the first years of our sample; in contrast, the period 2002-2009 is more
influential in the US. Overall, these results show that the two banking sectors
have developed rather differently over the sample period: merely observing
productivity growth in both sectors hides the underlying dynamic effects which
shape these industries.
V. Conclusion
We contribute to the growing literature on the restructuring of firm assets by
studying the productivity dynamics characterizing the banking markets in the
EU and the US. Both markets went through a significant consolidation over the
last decades, which has changed the banking sector landscape. We construct
productivity indicators for banks, using an estimated stochastic output distance
function to compute TFP growth. Using these indicators, we document an
increase in productivity in both sectors.
Contrary to most manufacturing studies, we find a limited role for reallocation
in explaining productivity growth over the sample period 1995-2009. However,
reallocation does take place: under-performing banks gained market share in
the US during the first sample years, while larger, more productive banks
expanded in Europe during the same period. In Europe, this process reverses
in later years, yielding limited effects near the end of our sample. Using a
longer horizon, we document long-run benefits from reallocation in the US,
but not in Europe. Within-firm productivity improvements have contributed
to productivity growth throughout, with technical progress as the underlying
driver.
The differences between the regions point to different market conditions
under which banks operate. We identify two reasons why the reallocation
pattern is different between the EU and US. First, it appears that large US
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banks have lost market share to competitors, while being more productive,
hence restraining productivity growth. In contrast, large European banks are
both more productive and have grown, fostering growth. Second, we find a
positive association between reallocation and markups in the US, and a negative
association in the EU. As banks are, on average, larger near the end of our
sample, reshuffling of market shares results in higher performance in the US,
while lowering growth in the EU.
This paper has borrowed from a literature focusing mostly on productivity at
manufacturing plants. We believe that, once appropriate adjustments are made
to important concepts such as productivity, the methods can be applied to many
industries, yielding interesting insights in the dynamic effects of changes in
operating conditions, such as globalization, openness to trade and deregulation.
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APPENDIX A: THE FOSTER-HALTIWANGER-KRIZAN DECOMPOSITION
Define productivity of firm i in year t as Πit, i = 1..I, t = 1..T. Let θit denote
the market share. We define industry-wide productivity asΠt =
It
∑
i=1
Πitθit, which
equals the weighted average productivity of all firms active at time t.
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The number of firms may change over time from It−1 to It. Letting N denote
entering firms, X denote exiting firms and S continuing firms, we obtain It−1 =
X + S and It = N + S. With these definitions, productivity growth between t− 1
and t can be written as follows:
∆Πt = Πt −Πt−1 =
It
∑
i=1
Πitθit −
It−1
∑
i=1
Πit−1θit−1
= ∑
i∈S
Πitθit + ∑
i∈N
Πitθit −
(
∑
i∈S
Πit−1θit−1 + ∑
i∈X
Πit−1θit−1
)(A.1)
By definition, market shares must sum to 1:
It
∑
i=1
θit = 1 ∀t. Therefore, we also
know that:
(A.2)
(
∑
i∈S
θit + ∑
i∈N
θit
)
−
(
∑
i∈S
θit−1 + ∑
i∈X
θit−1
)
= 0.
From equation A.1, we add and subtract:
(A.3) ∑
i∈S
Πitθit−1,
and we subtract:
(A.4) Πt−1
((
∑
i∈S
θit + ∑
i∈N
θit
)
−
(
∑
i∈S
θit−1 + ∑
i∈X
θit−1
))
,
to obtain the following:
∆Πt = ∑
i∈S
Πitθit + ∑
i∈N
Πitθit −∑
i∈S
Πit−1θit−1 − ∑
i∈X
Πit−1θit−1 +∑
i∈S
Πitθit−1
−∑
i∈S
Πitθit−1 −Πt−1
((
∑
i∈S
θit + ∑
i∈N
θit
)
−
(
∑
i∈S
θit−1 + ∑
i∈X
θit−1
))
= ∑
i∈S
(Πit −Πit−1)θit−1 +∑
i∈S
Πit(θit − θit−1)−Πt−1∑
i∈S
(θit − θit−1)
+ ∑
i∈N
(Πit −Πt−1)θit − ∑
i∈X
(Πit−1 −Πt−1)θit−1
= ∑
i∈S
(Πit −Πit−1)θit−1 +∑
i∈S
(Πit −Πt−1)(θit − θit−1)
+ ∑
i∈N
(Πit −Πt−1)θit − ∑
i∈X
(Πit−1 −Πt−1)θit−1,
(A.5)
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which is equal to equation (15). For this decomposition, productivity growth
is due to within-firm productivity growth evaluated at initial market shares
(the first term), market share reallocation towards above-average productive
firms (the second term), entrants with productivity above the previous period’s
average productivity (the third term) and due to below-average firms exiting the
market (the fourth term). This decomposition is due to Foster, Haltiwanger and
Krizan (2001).
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